

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LISBON 04414 111749Z

43

ACTION AF-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00 L-01

SP-02 PM-03 DODE-00 EUR-08 SAM-01 DRC-01 RSC-01 /051 W

----- 095951

P R 111620Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY LISBON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 747

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES

AMCONSUL LUANDA

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION USUN

AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

AMCONSUL OPORTO

AMCONSUL PONTA DELGADA

C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 4414

LIMDIS

USCINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

CINCLANT ALSO FOR POLAD

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, PO

SUBJ: FOREIGN MINISTER SOARES' COMMENTS ON

PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SITUATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LISBON 04414 111749Z

SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER SOARES DESCRIBED SPINOLA'S PATERNALISTIC GOVERNING STYLE AND DESIRE FOR DE GAULLE-TYPE AUTHORITY AS LEADING TO HIS FALL FROM POWER. SOARES FEELS PREDICTIONS OF LEFTIST SHIFT SINCE SEPTEMBER 28 ARE EXAGGERATED AND POINTS TO SEVERAL CENTRIST APPOINTMENTS IN REBUTTAL. ALSO DESCRIBES COSTA GOMES' STRENGTH. END SUMMARY.

IN OCTOBER 10 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR AND VISITING DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, FOREIGN MINISTER SOARES MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. SPINOLA WAS TRYING TO RUN TOO MUCH OF A ONE MAN SHOW, WHICH CREATED CHAOS IN THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT. THERE ARE COUNTLESS ILLUSTRATIONS OF THIS BEHAVIOR PATTERN BUT A FEW EXAMPLES WILL SUFFICE.

1. HE DIDN'T TELL ANYONE IN ADVANCE ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH MOBUTU. BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRIME MINISTER LEFT IN DARK ABOUT IT AND FOUND OUT ONLY DAY BEFORE MEETING WHEN PROTOCOL CHIEF IN FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORMED SOARES HE WAS GOING WITH SPINOLA TO SAL ISLAND. SPINOLA NEVER TOLD ANYBODY WHAT TRANSPIRED BETWEEN HIM AND MOBUTU. HE ALSO NEVER TOLD ANYBODY WHAT TRANSPIRED BETWEEN HIM AND NIXON AT AZORES MEETING.

2. HE ANNOUNCED MAJOR NEW STEPS IN DECOLONIZATION PROCESS WITHOUT CONSULTING HIS MINISTERS. HAVING OBSTINATELY RESISTED MINISTERS' URGINGS TO ACCEPT A PHASED PROGRAM LEADING FROM SELF-DETERMINATION TO INDEPENDENCE, SUDDENLY ON JULY 27 HE MADE SPEECH IN EFFECT LINKING SELF-DETERMINATION INEVITABLY WITH INDEPENDENCE AND THUS GOING MUCH FARTHER THAN MINISTERS HAD BEEN URGING.

B. SPINOLA WANTED TO GOVERN PORTUGAL AS HE HAD PORTUGUESE GUINEA IN A PATERNAL FASHION. IN DOING SO, HE WAS OFTEN MERCURIAL, FREQUENTLY REVERSING HIS FIELD ON KEY DECISIONS. HE TRIED THROUGH PALMA CARLOS IN JULY TO BE POPULARLY ELECTED HIMSELF AND TO DELAY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS. THE SILENT MAJORITY DEMONSTRATION WAS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LISBON 04414 111749Z

MEANT TO ACCOMPLISH THE SAME END: TO OBTAIN FOR HIM THE STRONG PRESIDENTIAL POWER WHICH DE GAULLE EXERCISED IN FRANCE.

C. THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENT SAW THE SILENT MAJORITY DEMONSTRATION AS A VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFRONTATION, WHICH COULD HOPELESSLY DIVIDE THE COUNTRY. SPINOLA HIMSELF DID NOT PLOT ANY KIND OF COUP IN CONNECTION WITH DEMONSTRATION BUT OTHER RIGHT WIND FORCES WERE PLANNING AT

LEAST ISOLATED ATTEMPTS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY.

D. AFM DID NOT SUPPORT SPINOLA ON DEMONSTRATION. SINCE HE HAD LOST THEIR CONFIDENCE AND HAD BEEN APPOINTED BY THEM, NOT POPULARLY ELECTED, HE CHOSE TO RESIGN. HE IS STILL, HOWEVER, ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH COSTA GOMES, HAVING LUNCHEDED WITH HIM RECENTLY. SPINOLA WILL PROBABLY RUN FOR PRESIDENT. HE IS STILL VERY POPULAR, PARTICULARLY WITH LOWER CLASSES WHO WANT A FATHER FIGURE IN AUTHORITY.

E. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE TRIED TO TAKE CREDIT FOR CANCELLATION OF THE DEMONSTRATION AND HAVE SOUGHT TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THEY ARE GETTING MORE INFLUENTIAL IN GOVERNMENT. THIS IS, HOWEVER, INCORRECT. IN FACT, THE COALITION PARTIES, WHICH ARE CLOSER TO THE CENTER, REMAIN THE KEY. PORTUGAL IS GOING TO BE NEITHER A CHILE NOR A CUBA, BUT RATHER A SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY, HOPEFULLY WITH A LOYAL RIGHT WING OPPOSITION. RELATIONS BETWEEN PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND CHURCH ARE ON EVEN KEEL. GOVERNMENT LEADERS ARE NOT PANICKED BUT RATHER PROCEEDING COOLY WITH THEIR PROGRAMS. RIGHTISTS ARE STILL A PROBLEM, HOWEVER, AS INDICATED BY POSTERS APPEARING IN NORTH CALLING FOR GIANT PILGRIMAGE TO FATIMA.

F. THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS VIRTUALLY THE SAME AS THE OLD DESPITE RUMORS THAT IT HAS SHIFTED DISTINCTLY TO THE LEFT. OF THOSE SPINOLISTAS WHO LEFT GOVERNMENT, SANCHES OSARIO HAD TO GO BECAUSE HE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (WHICH SPECIFICALLY OPPOSED THE STATEMENT) AS APPEAL FOR THE BARRICADES TO BE REMOVED SO THAT THE "SILENT MAJORITY" DEMONSTRATION COULD TAKE PLACE. THE OTHER, DEFENSE MINISTER FIRMINO MIGUEL, WAS URGED BY ALL HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES TO STAY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 LISBON 04414 111749Z

BUT LEFT OUT OF PERSONAL LOYALTY TO SPINOLA. HE, HOWEVER, HAS JUST BEEN APPOINTED BY NEW GOVERNMENT TO TAKE PART IN A MISSION TO KINSHASA CONCERNING THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM, A MOVE HARDLY CONSISTENT WITH A SHARP LEFTIST SHIFT IN THE GOVERNMENT. OTHER SIGNS OF A MORE CENTRIST CHARACTER TO THE NEW REGIME: THE PROBABILITY THAT TWO SPINOLA APPOINTEES TO "CITIZEN" MEMBERSHIP OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE, BOTH OF WHOM ARE AMONG SPINOLA'S CLOSEST ASSOCIATES, COLONELS DURAO AND BRUNO, ARE NOW GOING TO ACCEPT COSTA GOMES' INVITATION TO STAY ON THE COUNCIL; THE APPOINTMENT TO THE COUNCIL OF STATE BY COSTA GOMES OF DR. TEIXEIRA RIBEIRO, A SOCIALIST BUT ON THE RIGHT WING, WHO IN PAST WAS FREQUENTLY CONSULTED ON FINANCIAL MATTERS BY SALAZAR, AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A LEFTIST.

G. NEW GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN WESTERN ORIENTED
AND STAY IN NATO WHILE KEEPING OTHER INTERNATIONAL
COMMITMENTS. UPCOMING VISITS OF BRANDT AND OLAF PALME
ARE INDICATIONS OF THIS. TRIP TO U.S. BY COSTA GOMES
IS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUITY OF FOREIGN
POLICY. COSTA GOMES HAS A SOLID POSITION BECAUSE OF HIS
WIDESPREAD SUPPORT IN THE MILITARY. ONE AFM MEMBER RECENTLY
TOLD SOARES THAT 30 TO 40 PERCENT OF MILITARY ARE PRO-
SPINOLA, 30 TO 40 PERCENT ARE ANTI-SPINOLA, BUT AT MINIMUM
80 PERCENT ARE PRO-COSTA GOMES.
SCOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PERSONAL OPINION, GOVERNMENT REFORM, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: shawdg
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974LISBON04414
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740290-0177
From: LISBON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741053/aaaabsut.tel
Line Count: 181
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: shawdg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 APR 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <18 MAR 2003 by shawdg>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FOREIGN MINISTER SOARES' COMMENTS ON PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SITUATION
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, PO, (SOARES)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005